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The NLRB's Proposed Rule for the
Determination of Health Care Bargaining
Units: Is the AHA Barking Up the
Wrong Tree?
Brenda Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1974, the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act" or
"NLRA") 1 has extended its protection to the employees in the en-
tire health care industry.2 The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") traditionally has applied a case-by-case ap-
proach3 to determining the appropriate bargaining units4 in health
care representation cases. 5 Under this approach, unions poten-
tially could be forced to litigate every job category in the health
care institution.6 In order to eliminate the necessity of protracted
* Associate, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammolz, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1982,
Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio; J.D. 1989, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (1935). Section 7 of the Act defines these employee pro-
tections as follows: "Employees shall have the right ... to form, join, or assist labor
organization ... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activi-
ties .. " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (as amended 1947). Furthermore, § 10 of the Act gives an
administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board, enforcement powers to pro-
tect these rights. "The Board is empowered... to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1935).
2. Although the employees of not-for-profit hospitals were excluded from the juris-
diction of the Act by the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act, the Act's jurisdiction
over these employees was restored by the 1974 Amendments to the Act. See also J.
Stephens, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, Remarks before the South-
western Legal Foundation (October 13, 1988) (available in Daily Labor Report (BNA)
No. 206 at D-1, 2 (October 25, 1988).
3. The Board shall decide in each case .... in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining.... ".29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1935) (emphasis
supplied).
4. The group of jobs that serves as the election constituency in an election held to
approve or reject union representation is a bargaining unit. If a union wins a representa-
tion election, it serves as the exclusive representative of all of the members of the bargain-
ing unit (including those members who voted against representation by that union) in
matters affecting terms and conditions of employment. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 66 (1976).
5. Stephens, supra note 2, at D-2.
6. Id. Prolonged litigation can have an adverse impact on unionization efforts be-
cause the delay between the filing of an election petition and the election diminishes the
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litigation, the NLRB exercised its rarely used substantive rulemak-
ing powers.7 On September 1, 1988, the NLRB published its pro-
posed rule for providing the appropriate bargaining units in the
health care industry.8 The rule included guidelines for the estab-
lishment of as many as eight bargaining units in health care institu-
tions, the largest number proposed since the NLRA was amended
to include not-for-profit health care institutions within the scope of
its jurisdiction.
This Article will examine the history of the Act in relation to
health care institutions and the controversy surrounding the so-
called "community-of-interests" and "disparity-of-interests" tests
that the NLRB has applied in determining the appropriate bar-
gaining units for health care institutions.9 The Article then will
explore the NLRB's rule governing the structure of health care
bargaining units."0 Following discussions of the impact of bargain-
ing unit determinations1 and the litigation associated with the pro-
posed rule,'2 the Article will question whether the proposed rule
can be amended in order to reduce the number of health care bar-
gaining units and, in turn, reduce the likelihood of interruption of
health care that could result from unit fragmentation. 3 Finally,
the Article will explore whether the American Hospital Associa-
tion ("AHA") should lobby Congress to amend the Act in order to
allow the NLRB to certify health care bargaining units containing
both technical and professional employees.' 4
odds of a union victory. Delaney & Sockell, Hospital Unit Determination and the Preser-
vation of Employee Free Choice, 39 LAB. L. J. 259, 261 (1988). See also Roomkin &
Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75, 76-77.
7. When the NLRB engages in substantive rulemaking, it utilizes rulemaking proce-
dures to announce substantive law principles. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 17. Substan-
tive law is "[t]hat part of law which creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties of
parties, as opposed to 'adjective, procedural, or remedial law,' which prescribes method
of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). Procedural or remedial law "prescribes methods of enforce-
ment of rights or obtaining redress for their invasion." Id. at 1203. Thus, in the health
care bargaining unit context, the Board's rulemaking has defined the parameters of the
bargaining units that health care unions may organize in exercise of the rights accorded
to employees under the NLRA.
8. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103) (proposed Sept. 1,
1988).
9. See infra notes 46-76 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 133-63 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Enactment of the National Labor Relations Act and the
Creation of the National Labor Relations Board
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA15 to alleviate the disrup-
tion of commerce that resulted from labor disputes. 16 The Act
withstood a constitutional attack in 1937, when the Supreme Court
ruled in a landmark decision, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.," that the commerce clause' s gave Congress the power to
regulate activities that "have such a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions....
The high court examined the congressional purpose of the Act 2°-
to eliminate the burden on the flow of commerce caused by the
inequality in bargaining power between employees and employ-
ers-and held that Congress has the power to regulate labor activi-
ties that affect interstate commerce.2" Towards that end, Congress
created the NLRB to implement the provisions of the Act.22 Con-
gress delegated to the NLRB both adjudicatory23 and rulemaking24
powers.
B. History of Jurisdiction in the Health Care Arena
Initially, certain categories of employers were excluded from the
Act's definition of "employer. '25 The Act did not specifically in-
clude or exclude non-profit health care institutions from coverage.
15. The NLRA also is known as the Wagner Act.
16. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
17. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18. "The Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
19. 301 U.S. at 37.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
21. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43; R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1935).
23. "The Board is empowered... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice ... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1935).
24. "The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind,
in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1947).
25. "The term 'employer' ... shall not include the United States,... or any State or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1935).
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In 1943, the NLRB interpreted the Act to include non-profit hos-
pitals within its jurisdiction.26 Congress negated this interpretation
in 1947, when it enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act.
The amendments altered many aspects of labor law, including the
exclusion of non-profit hospitals from the definition of "employer",
and the elimination of the NLRB's jurisdiction over these types of
institutions.27 Although the Senate Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare believed that the amendment was unnecessary because
hospitals were not engaged in interstate commerce, 28 a floor
amendment providing for the exclusion of nonprofit hospitals
passed the Senate and House after brief debate.29
During the Senate debate, Senator Tydings, who offered the por-
tion of the amendment excluding not-for-profit hospitals from the
Act's jurisdiction, explained that the amendment was intended to
"be very helpful [to nonprofit hospitals] in their efforts to serve
those who have not the means to pay for hospital service .. "30
He further explained that, in his opinion, the amendment would
not prevent the employees of not-for-profit hospitals from organiz-
ing a union, but that "[t]hey should not have to come to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board [to do so]."'" By removing the
employees of not-for-profit hospitals from the scope of the Act's
jurisdiction, however, the amendment eliminated the ability of the
NLRB to prevent not-for-profit hospital employers from engaging
in unfair labor practices.
After the advent of Taft-Hartley, the NLRB excluded the rest of
the health care industry from the NLRA's coverage. The Board
considered most proprietary hospitals and nursing homes to be lo-
cal operations not affecting interstate commerce; therefore, in
Flatbush General Hospital,3 2 the Board declined to assert its juris-
26. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 50 N.L.R.B. 393, 398 n.5 (1943), en-
forcement granted, 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945). The
Board noted that because the Act made no distinction between for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals, it could be inferred that Congress intended to include not-for-profit hos-
pitals within the Act's jurisdiction.
27. "The term 'employer'... shall not include . . . any corporation or association
operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1947).
28. 93 CONG. REC. 4996, 4997 (1947). At that time, there is evidence that Congress
believed nonprofit hospitals did not affect interstate commerce because they were charita-
ble institutions. 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Mr. Williams).
29. J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER, & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRI-
ATE BARGAINING UNIT 243 (revised ed. 1981) [hereinafter ABODEELY].
30. Id. at 242-43.
31. Id. at 243.
32. 126 N.L.R.B. 144 (1960).
1120 [Vol. 21
Determination of Health Care Units
diction over these health care institutions.33 In 1967, however, the
Board overruled Flatbush and adopted jurisdictional standards
over proprietary hospitals and nursing homes. In Butte Medical
Properties34 and University Nursing Home, Inc. ,35 the NLRB con-
cluded that since the Flatbush decision, the impact of the operation
of health care institutions on interstate commerce had expanded
greatly because of their increasing size and reliance on federal fi-
nancial support. The increasing effect on interstate commerce and
the need for national uniform regulations to engender stable indus-
trial relations convinced the Board to assert its jurisdiction over
the proprietary health care industry.
As a result of the Board's new position, employees of not-for-
profit health care institutions were denied the same rights36 that
employees of proprietary institutions enjoyed. Legal scholars criti-
cized the Board decision as illogical, noting that duties and respon-
sibilities of health care employees were the same whether their
employers were not-for-profit or proprietary institutions.37 In
1974, therefore, Congress amended the NLRA to extend its cover-
33. Section 14(c)(1) of the Act grants the Board the discretion to decline jurisdiction
when the effect of a labor dispute on commerce "is not sufficiently substantial." 29
U.S.C. § 14(c)(1). Another section of the Act stated that the Board could not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute under the standards in existence on August 1,
1959. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1959). Under the standards prevailing on August 1, 1959,
the NLRB had asserted jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals in the following three situ-
ations: when a hospital's operations vitally affected national defense, when the hospital
was located in the District of Columbia, and when "the hospital was an integral part of
the establishment whose operations met the Board's jurisdictional standards." Flatbush,
126 N.L.R.B. at 145. Therefore, the Board concluded that under § 14(c)(1) of the Act, it
could decline to assert jurisdiction over all proprietary hospitals that did not meet these
criteria. Id. at 146.
34. 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967) (jurisdiction asserted over proprietary hospitals
having annual gross revenues of $250,000 or more).
35. 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 264 (1967) (jurisdiction asserted over proprietary nursing
homes having annual gross revenues of $100,000 or more).
36. Specifically, these employees were denied their § 7 right to form, join, assist, or
refrain from joining labor organizations. In addition, they were not afforded the Act's
protection from employer unfair labor practices. It is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
37. ABODEELY, supra note 29, at 244-45. Senator Taft, the son of Senator Robert
Taft, co-sponsor of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, remarked: "There is no logical reason
why employees engaged in the same industry should be treated differently; employees of
nonprofit organizations being deprived of statutory benefits while another segment of em-
ployees is accorded rights." 120 CONG. REC. 22,579 (1974). Although the NLRB simi-
larly had declined to assert jurisdiction over nonprofit private colleges and universities,
see e.g., Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951), the Board reversed its
position in 1970 and brought private nonprofit colleges and universities that met a mini-
mum level of gross annual revenues within its jurisdiction. Cornell University, 183
N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Thereafter, hospitals were the only category of nonprofit private
employers completely excluded from the Act's jurisdiction.
11211990]
Loyola University Law Journal
age to not-for-profit health care institutions.38 Congress eliminated
the nonprofit hospital exemption because it believed that the qual-
ity of health care would improve if the protections of the Act were
extended to all health care workers.39 Citing the inferior working
conditions and high turnover rate in the health care industry, 40
Congress determined that extending collective bargaining rights to
health care workers would alleviate poor conditions and would
raise the standard of patient care.41
During the hearings preceding the enactment of the 1974
amendments, proposals were made to limit the number of appro-
priate health care bargaining units.42 A majority of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare opposed a statutory limi-
tation on the number of units on the ground that such an approach
would eliminate the NLRB's discretion to determine the appropri-
ateness of bargaining units on a case-by-case basis. "3 As a compro-
mise, the Committee agreed to try "jawboning," that is, warning
the NLRB to avoid undue proliferation in the number of bargain-
ing units approved in health care institutions." The courts inter-
preted this congressional admonishment in various ways, causing a
controversy over the means the Board should apply to determine
appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. 45 These
interpretations are discussed in turn.
38. 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1947).
39. One commentator described the situation this way:
The long hours worked and the small monetary reward received by hospital
workers result in a constant turnover with a consequent threat to the mainte-
nance of an adequate standard of medical care .... Indeed it has been convinc-
ingly argued that when hospital employees are unionized... the result is better
job stability and security than is possible without such collective bargaining ar-
rangements. This will also mean a better job done in terms of the quality of
patient care provided ...
120 CONG. REC. 12,937-38 (1974) (remarks of Senator Cranston). See also R. Vernon,
Labor Relations in the Health Care Field under the 1974 Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 202, 203-04 (1975).
40. 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974).
41. See 120 CONG. REC. 16,899-900 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
42. See Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under National Labor Relations Act: Hear-
ings on S. 794 and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93 CONG. Rnc. 12,934 (1973).
43. See 120 CONG. REc. 12,941, 12,944 (1974); ABODEELY, supra note 29, at 248.
44. Warning the Board to prevent proliferation of bargaining units in the health care
industry, the Committee cited the following Board decisions with approval and offered
them for guidance: Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 85 L.R.R.M.
1093 (1974); Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 84 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1973);
Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 83 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1973). 42 S.
Rep. No. 93-766,'93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
45. ABODEELY, supra note 29, at 269-76.
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C. St. Francis I: The Community-of-Interests Test
Before the 1974 Amendments, the Board traditionally had ap-
plied the "community-of-interests" test to bargaining unit determi-
nations in all other industries. The Board first articulated this test
in American Cyanamid Co.6 There, the Board based its grant of a
separate unit to maintenance employees because they are readily
identifiable as a group whose "similarity of function and skills cre-
ate a community of interest such as would warrant separate repre-
sentation. ' 47 In Allegheny General Hospital, the NLRB extended
the community-of-interests standard to health care bargaining unit
determinations. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, de-
nied enforcement of the Board's unit determination, holding, in ef-
fect, that the Board had an obligation to balance the congressional
concern for over-proliferation of health care bargaining units
against the community-of-interests criteria.48
In recognition of the Third Circuit's criticism, the Board estab-
lished a two-part community-of-interests standard for health care
bargaining unit determinations.49  Under this standard, the pro-
posed unit had to fit one of the seven classifications of employees
that the NLRB established as presumptively appropriate bargain-
ing units.5 0 Only if a proposed unit fit one of the classifications
would the second step--the traditional community-of-interests
test-be applied to the proposed unit.5 The Board asserted that
46. 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961).
47. In applying the community-of-interests test in non-health related industries, the
Board has considered factors such as (1) the similarity in the work done by the employ-
ees; (2) similarity in training and skill; (3) similarity in earnings; (4) common supervision;
(5) history of relationships in collective bargaining; (6) similarity in terms and conditions
of employment; (7) the affected employee's wishes; and, (8) the frequency of contact with
other employees. See Riverside Methodist Hosp., 241 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1979); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
See also Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis
of Congressional Intent and Its Implementation by the National Labor Relations Board, 20
B.C.L. REV. 867, 896 (1979); R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 69.
48. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 608 F.2d at 966. The court took the Board to task for
declining to follow judicial precedent "while conceding applicability of that precedent."
Id. In an earlier decision, the Third Circuit had ruled that the 1974 Amendments pre-
cluded the Board from using the traditional standards (ie., community-of-interests crite-
ria) in making health care bargaining unit determinations. St. Vincent's Hospital v.
NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
49. St. Francis Hosp. ("St. Francis I"), 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
50. Id. at 1029. The seven classifications were physicians, registered nurses, other
professional employees, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service
and maintenance employees, and skilled maintenance employees.
51. Id. If the proposed unit does not fit one of the seven presumptively appropriate
classifications, it will not be approved by the NLRB.
11231990]
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this two-part community-of-interests standard met its responsibil-
ity to avoid undue proliferation in the number of health care bar-
gaining units.5
2
D. St. Francis IL The Disparity-of-Interests Test
The controversy surrounding the appropriate test for the deter-
mination of health care bargaining units did not subside with the
St. Francis I decision. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital of Lynwood,53 urged the applica-
tion of a disparity-of-interests test, defined as one in which the
Board must "focus[ ] upon the disparity of interest between em-
ployee groups which would prohibit or inhibit their representation
of employee interests."54 In another Ninth Circuit case, NLRB v.
HMO Intern. /California Med. ,- the court clarified the meaning of
the test: "[s]eparate bargaining units in the health care field must
be justified in terms of a disparity that precludes combination, not
an internal consistency within a class that could justify separa-
tion.""6 The same court again advocated a disparity-of-interests
test six months before the NLRB rendered the St. Francis I deci-
sion57, and the Tenth Circuit espoused the test two years later.58
Both circuits based their opinions on the congressional admonition
in the 1974 amendments to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining
units.
The St. Francis I disparity-of-interests test and unit determina-
tions relying on it never saw "the light of day."59 In fact, before
the Board issued a single health care unit determination, it recon-
sidered and overruled St. Francis L 60 The Board determined, in St.
Francis II,61 that the community-of-interests test was contrary to
Congress' intent and that the disparity-of-interests test would best
effectuate the Board's obligation to avoid undue proliferation of
52. Id.
53. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 419.
55. 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 812 n.17 (emphasis in original).
57. Id.
58. Southwest Community Health Servs. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir.
1984).
59. St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW ("St. Francis II"), 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 955 (1984)
(Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
60. Comment, The St. Francis II Disparity of Interests Test: Is it Necessary?, 9 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 315 (1987).
61. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984).
[Vol. 211124
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health care bargaining units.62 This reversal was based in part
upon the rulings of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in favor of the
disparity-of-interests test, despite the disagreement of the Second,63
Eighth,' and Eleventh 65 Circuits.
It must be recognized, however, that the Board's reversal also
can be explained on the basis of the change in the membership of
the Board in the two years that passed between the two St. Francis
decisions. NLRB members are appointed by the president and
serve five-year terms.6 6 In St. Francis I, members Miller, Zimmer-
man, and Jenkins wrote the majority opinion, adopting the com-
munity-of-interest standard. Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter dissented. Chairman Van de Water argued that
in keeping with the congressional admonition against unit prolifer-
ation, only two health care units, professional and nonprofessional,
were appropriate. Member Jenkins argued that the disparity-of-
interests test should be adopted for health care unit determina-
tions. In St. Francis II, on the other hand, Chairman Dotson and
Member Hunter (who wrote a dissent in St. Francis I) wrote the
majority opinion, adopting the disparity-of-interests test. Member
Diaz-Dennis concurred, but urged the Board to engage in rulemak-
ing on the issue. Member Zimmerman, who had joined in the ma-
jority opinion in St. Francis I, dissented.6
62. Id. at 950.
63. See Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.
1983). In Masonic Hall, a nursing home refused to bargain with service and maintenance
workers, arguing that the Board improperly had certified their unit rather than a unit of
all employees. The Second Circuit stated that the "rigid 'disparity of interests' test is
inconsistent with the compromise struck by Congress ... at the same time, protect[ing]
labor and management rights and promot[ing] good health care." Id. at 641.
64. Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 849 (8th Cir. 1983). In
Watonwan, the employer hospital contended that a bargaining unit containing all techni-
cal employees was inappropriate. The Eighth Circuit noted that the 1974 amendments
do not require the Board to select the largest appropriate bargaining unit, but rather
require the Board to certify "an appropriate" bargaining unit. Id. at 850 (emphasis in
original).
65. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984).
In Walker County, the employer hospital claimed that the Board, in certifying a unit
consisting only of registered nurses, had failed to consider the congressional admonition
against the undue proliferation of bargaining units. In rejecting the disparity-of-interests
test, the Walker County court remarked, "[W]e find it difficult to find where in the legisla-
tive history to the 1974 NLRA amendments this 'disparity of interest' standard is
stated." Id. at 1539, n.4.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1947).
67. Noting a similar reversal in Board policy in the early 1960s, Professor Bernard
Meltzer has written that "[These] changes were too rapid to be ascribed to institutional
developments or to new insights produced by a maturing expertise; they reflected the
different value preferences of new appointees interacting with loose statutory provisions."
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In response to numerous criticisms, the NLRB stated that it was
"not establishing a rigid disparity-of-interests test that would al-
ways result in two broad units."' 6 Instead, the Board asserted that
it would reach unit determinations on a case-by-case basis while
focusing on the disparity-of-interests between the petitioned-for
unit and other proposed units.69 Perhaps the strongest criticism of
the disparity-of-interests test came from the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union 474 v. NLRB.7 ° The Local 474
court noted that the congressional admonition to avoid undue
proliferation of bargaining units merely was a part of the House
and Senate Committee Reports of the 1974 Amendments, and "a
committee report cannot serve as an independent statutory source
having the force of law.""' In addition, the Local 474 court noted
that Congress had decided against modifying Section 9 of .the
NLRA72 as part of the 1974 amendments, and that the amend-
ments did not, as the Board had ruled in St. Francis II, mandate
the use of a disparity-of-interests standard.73
More criticism came from within the Board itself. In his dissent
in St. Francis II, Member Zimmerman suggested that the Board
engage in rulemaking to end the controversy over the appropriate
test to apply.74 In support of this suggestion, he cited the lack of
predictability in the sufficiency of evidence to prove a disparity of
interests and the increasing litigation surrounding health care bar-
gaining unit determinations. 7" Although she had concurred in the
St. Francis I1 majority opinion, Member Diaz-Dennis likewise
urged that the Board exercise its rulemaking authority because it
would "provide[] health care labor relations with immediate stabil-
B. Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 78 (1962-63).
68. St. Francis I1, 271 N.L.R.B. 953, n.39 (emphasis in original). See also St. Francis
1, 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting).
69. 271 N.L.R.B. at 953, n.39.
70. 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 712.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982). Section 9 of the NLRA allows the Board broad discre-
tion to determine appropriate bargaining units. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers,
Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971).
73. Local 474, 814 F.2d at 712.
74. St. Francis 11, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 958 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
75. Id. at 956. Member Zimmerman stated that "the continuing lack of definitive
guidelines for appropriate units has gradually paralyzed the processing of all Board repre-
sentation cases in the industry. Consequently, thousands of employees have been denied
their right to choose or reject collective-bargaining representation." Id. at 955.
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ity and certainty, and obviate[] continued litigation....
III. THE PROPOSED RULE FOR APPROPRIATE HEALTH CARE
BARGAINING UNITS
A. The Board's Power to Engage in Rulemaking
In the wake of this powerful disapproval, the Board proposed to
amend its rule to specify appropriate bargaining units in the health
care industry." This was considered a dramatic step, for although
Congress gave the Board the power to engage in substantive
rulemaking pursuant to section 6 of the Act, the Board almost
never does so. In the thirteen years following the enactment of the
1974 Amendments, however, neither of the Board's doctrinal for-
mulas for determining the appropriate health care bargaining units
generally had been accepted by the courts.7 Furthermore, the
Board acknowledged 79 that, for some time, numerous judges and
scholars had been urging the Board to engage in bargaining unit
rulemaking. 0 Thus, the dramatic step was a necessary one.
B. The Hearings
Following its original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
Board conducted hearings at which representatives from numerous
health care associations and unions testified." The Board also re-
ceived written comments from 315 individuals and organizations.8 2
A number of health care employers, including the American Hos-
76. Id. at 954-55 (Member Diaz-Dennis, concurring).
77. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103 (proposed July 2,
1987). Section 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1935), requires the Board to decide
the appropriateness of units "in each case," but a leading authority on administrative law
has concluded that the Board may decide "in each case" with the help of rules that it
establishes. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 145 (3d ed. 1972) ('.'The man-
date to decide 'in each case' does not prevent the Board from supplanting the original
discretionary chaos with some degree of order, and the principal instruments for regular-
izing the system of deciding 'in each case' are classifications, rules, principles and
precedents.")
78. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,901 (1988).
79. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,145 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103 (proposed July 2,
1987).
80. See e.g., NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) (The
NLRB would be entitled to greater judicial deference if it "awakened its dormant
rulemaking powers."); Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House: Can an Old Board Learn
New Tricks? 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 27 (1987).
81. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,900 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103) (proposed
September 1, 1988).
82. Id.
Loyola University Law Journal
pital Association, opposed the Board's proposed rulemaking. 3
They claimed that the diversity within the health care industry and
the need for flexibility in responding to rapid changes in the indus-
try precluded rulemaking. 4 Further, some employers insisted that
if the Board persisted in rulemaking, it should limit appropriate
health care units to those composed of professional employees and
nonprofessional employees (plus guards).85 The employers argued
that only two major units were justified because all health care pro-
fessionals interact on the job and because the distinctions among
various classifications of nonprofessionals were not sufficient to
support separating or classifying them into distinct units.8 6 Health
care industry employers cited further arguments against the estab-
lishment of more than two bargaining units. The employers
claimed that changes in the health care industry required a team
approach; strikes, jurisdictional disputes', and wage whipsawing 8
might arise from unit proliferation. Further, an increase in the
number of bargaining units would result in increased operating
costs.8 9
Because lengthy delays and protracted litigation surrounding
bargaining unit determinations had made organizing difficult, the
unions that participated in the Board hearings supported the
Board's rulemaking.90 The unions asserted that employers had
been able to use delay as a strategy in opposing unionization,9 and
if the Board established a uniform rule, much of the delay would
83. Id. at 33,901.
84. Id. at 33,901-02.
85. Id. at 33,906.
86. Id.
87. In a jurisdictional dispute, a labor organization seeks to force an employer "to
assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization .... 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(D) (1982). Such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice. Even if health
care workers were willing to violate the Act by engaging in jurisdictional disputes, state
licensure or certification of health care professionals "make[s] job interchange impossible,
or even illegal .... North Arundel Hosp. & Maryland Nurses Ass'n, 279 N.L.R.B. 311,
312 (1986).
88. The term whipsaw means "to worst or victimize in two opposite ways at once by
a two-phase operation, or by the collusive action of two opponents." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1344 (1989). In the labor context, a union may try to
whipsaw an employer into granting wage increases to the members of one unit because
the employer granted wage increases to the members of another unit.
89. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,900, 33,906-10.
90. Id. at 33,902.
91. Management consultant Raymond Mickus predicted that "the NLRB rules will
spark much more union activity.... Under the rules there will be much faster elections
[because] employers won't have access to hearings or briefs which used to delay the pro-
ceedings .. " [Current Developments] Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 162 at A-2
(Aug. 6, 1987).
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be eliminated 92 The unions also argued that the cost pressures
under which hospitals operate are not causally related to the or-
ganization of the hospital labor force,93 and that there is a lower
incidence of strike activity in the health care field than in other
industries. 94 In response to health care employers' argument that
the Board should not allow the establishment of more than two
bargaining units because it would increase operating costs, some
unions questioned whether costs had any relevance to at all. 95
C. The Rule
Although some witnesses had stated that the establishment of
multiple units would lead to a parade of horrors, the Board found
that these fears were not supported by credible evidence. 96 In an-
swer to the contention that health care employers could not afford
to engage in collective bargaining with their employees, the Board
noted that Congress had rejected this rationale when it passed the
1974 amendments out of concern for the low wages and poor
working conditions of hospital employees.97 The Board concluded
that health care employers' costs associated with union organizing
were irrelevant to the Board's determination of appropriate bar-
gaining units because unionization might improve health care
workers' wages and working conditions. 98 The Board did not con-
sider the costs that employers could save by avoiding unionization
through delay to be a legitimate reason legislating against rulemak-
ing. After the hearings, the Board concluded that rulemaking
would actually reduce the costs associated with litigation.
After considering the testimony and written comments, the
Board published a proposed rule for the appropriate bargaining
units in the health care industry.99 Instead of restricting the
number of units to two"° (plus a unit for guards) 1 ' as it had in St.
92. Id.
93. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,903 (1988).
94. Id. at 33,908.
95. Id. at 33,909.
96. Id. at 33,908.
97. Id. at 33,909.
98. Id. See also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 497-98 (1978) (citing 120
Cong. Rec. 12936-38 (1974)).
99. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Sep-
tember 1, 1988). Psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes were excluded from coverage.
Id. at 33, 932-33.
100. A professional unit and a nonprofessional unit.
101. Section 9(b)(3) of the NLRA requires that guards be placed in a bargaining unit
separate from other employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b)(3) (1947).
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Francis II, the Board determined that eight units were appropriate
for the health care industry: registered nurses, physicians, other
professionals, technicals, skilled maintenance, business office cleri-
cals, other non-professionals, and guards.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Impact of Bargaining Unit Determinations
In order for the National Labor Relations Board to direct an
election, a union must demonstrate a "showing of interest." 10 2
Thus, the size of a designated bargaining unit bears a direct corre-
lation with the success rate of hospital union organizing efforts and
can determine whether an election will be held. 10 3 Unions typically
experience difficulty in organizing large units.'04 Because large
units may encompass employees who have diverse interests and
goals, unions may become entangled in conflicts of interest in at-
tempting to represent fairly all the employees of a large unit. 0 5
The Board has recognized that "broad units militate against or-
ganizing by health care workers." °0 The disparity-of-interests pre-
sumption that only two health care bargaining units may be found
appropriate frustrates the congressional goal of extending collec-
tive bargaining rights to health care workers. 10 7
The difficulties associated with organizing a professional unit,
one of the two units presumed appropriate under the disparity-of-
interests test, illustrate the manner in which broad bargaining units
interfere with the unionization of health care workers. 108 If a unit
encompasses all health care professionals, then physicians, regis-
tered nurses, and other professionals would have to reach a consen-
sus on whether they should engage in collective bargaining. 1° 9
Such a consensus is unlikely, however, given that these employees
have such varied professional and employment goals."10
In its rule, the NLRB proposed that registered nurses should
102. This "showing of interest" usually is demonstrated with cards signed by at least
30 % of the employees in the bargaining unit designating the union as the desired bar-
gaining representative. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 41.
103. Id. at 67; Delaney, Union Success in Hospital Representation Elections, 20 IN-
DUS. REL. 149, 159 (1981).
104. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 67.
105. Id.
106. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,910 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103) (proposed Sep-
tember 1, 1988).
107. Comment, supra note 60, at 320.
108. Delaney & Sockell, supra note 6, at 260.
109. Comment, supra note 60, at 320-21.
110. Id.
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constitute a separate appropriate bargaining unit because of their
unique responsibilities and interests."' Registered nurses, unlike
other health care professionals, interact continually with pa-
tients." 2 They also fill out incident reports on mistakes (such as
incorrect medication dosages) made by other hospital workers.1 3
As the Board noted, nurses' responsibility to report other workers'
mistakes may result in antagonism between the RNs and other
professionals in a bargaining unit." 4 Such antagonism could inter-
fere with collective bargaining by the professionals as a group."'
The Board also found that because of their unique responsibili-
ties and interests, physicians should constitute a separate appropri-
ate bargaining unit." 6 Doctors earn considerably more than other
professionals and frequently are salaried. Therefore, unlike other
health care professionals, they have little concern with hourly wage
rates. Furthermore, doctors bear the overall responsibility for the
quality of patient care; registered nurses and other health care pro-
fessionals accept orders from physicians." 7
Even though other health care professionals such as social work-
ers, laboratory technologists, and pharmacists might desire to be
placed in separate units, the NLRB decided to create a proposed
rule providing for a unit including all health care professionals
(with the exception of physicians and registered nurses)."18 The
NLRB reasoned that these professionals shared superior education
and training.' 9 The agency also expressed the fear that if it al-
lowed these professionals to form their own distinct bargaining
units, there would be the very unit proliferation that Congress
wanted to avoid. 20
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the NLRB determined
that technical employees' 2' should constitute another separate ap-
propriate bargaining unit. Technical employees possess higher
111. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,900, 33,912.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,900, 33,917.
117. The Board stated in its second notice of proposed rulemaking that "to include
[physicians] with RNs and other professionals [in a bargaining unit] seems likely to lead
to divisiveness and quite possibly to conflicts of interest." Id.
118. Id. at 33,918.
119. Id.
120. Id. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text (congressional admonition
discussed).
121. This category would include medical laboratory, respiratory therapy, radiogra-
phy, emergency medicine, and medical records technicians. Id.
11311990]
Loyola University Law Journal
levels of skill and education than other nonprofessionals, and earn
substantially more than other health care nonprofessionals.1 22
They experience only minimal contact with other health care
workers.1 23 Because a technical unit encompasses a number of job
classifications and constitutes approximately seventeen percent of
the health care work force, the NLRB did not believe that a sepa-
rate technical unit violated the congressional admonition against
undue unit proliferation.1 24
The NLRB allowed skilled maintenance workers to form their
own bargaining units because unlike unskilled service, mainte-
nance, and clerical employees, skilled maintenance workers oper-
ate and repair complex and sophisticated equipment.1 25 Skilled
maintenance employees possess distinct bargaining interests such
as tool supply allowances and consultation with regard to the sub-
contracting of work.1 26 Like the technical unit, the skilled mainte-
nance unit encompasses a number of employee classifications. 27
The NLRB believed, therefore, that it was not allowing undue unit
proliferation by creating a separate skilled maintenance unit.128
Business office clericals have job duties and functions differing
from those of service and maintenance workers, possess a higher
level of education than service and maintenance workers1 29, and
have health and safety concerns distinct from those of service and
maintenance workers. 30  Consequently, the NLRB approved a
separate business office clerical unit as an appropriate health care
bargaining unit. 31 In further support of its decision, the NLRB
also cited the unique bargaining interests of business office cleri-
cals, such as video display terminal distress. 3 2
B. The Injunction Barring Enforcement of the Rule
On April 21, 1989, the Board published its final rule on health
care bargaining units. 33 The American Hospital Association im-
mediately filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
122. Id.
123. Id at 33,919.
124. Id. at 33,920.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 33,922.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 33,924.
130. Id. at 32,925.
131. Id. at 33,926.
132. Id.
133. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336-48 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103).
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the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a permanent injunction to
prevent the Board from enforcing its new health care bargaining
unit rule.' 34 The AHA provided three reasons for invalidating the
rule: The rule violated section 9(b) of the Act; the rule violated the
congressional admonition against undue proliferation of bargaining
units; and the rule was arbitrary and not supported by substantial
evidence.' 35 The AHA prevailed, and the district court entered an
order permanently enjoining the Board's enforcement of the
rule. 136
Although the court granted the injunction, it did not agree with
some of the reasons advanced by the AHA for invalidating the
rule. Specifically, the court disagreed with the AHA's assertion
that rulemaking was inconsistent with section 9(b)'s requirement
that the Board decide unit determinations on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 1 37 The court did, however, concur with the AHA's claim that
the rule violated the congressional admonition against undue
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry.'3 The
court stated that "when the Board takes action or crafts policy
with respect to bargaining units involving health care employees, it
must use the means least likely to cause unit proliferation to
achieve their objective."' 39 Because the rule established the "auto-
matic fragmentation of the work force into eight units, without re-
gard to the nature and the extent of the health services rendered or
the dynamics of a particular health care institution,"'" the court
held that the rule could cause fragmentation.' 4'
The court indicated that the rule would have been more accepta-
ble had it been promulgated as "guidelines" or "rebuttable pre-
sumptions" rather than as a mandate that would be modified only
if a hospital established the existence of "extraordinary circum-
stances."' 142  In conclusion, the court ruled that the NLRB's
134. AKA v. NLRB, 718 F.Supp. 704 (N.D. II. 1989).
135. Id. at 705.
136. Id. at 716.
137. Id. at 713. The court stated that "[i]t would be a misuse of resources to prevent
the Board from using fact gathering apparatus to develop principles applicable to recur-
ring scenarios. It defies common sense to believe Congress would entrust unit determina-
tion to the Board under section 9 because of its experience and expertise, and then,
simultaneously require it to face each contested case ab initio." Id.
138. Because the court entered an order granting the injunction on this ground, it
found that there was no reason to consider the AHA's assertion that the rules were arbi-
trary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 716 n. 17.
139. Id. at 714.
140. Id. (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 714-16.
142. The Board concluded that none of the arguments raised in the course of the
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health-care bargaining unit rule violated the congressional admoni-
tion against undue proliferation of health-care bargaining units be-
cause they "encourage[], and perhaps coerce[], fragmentation of
the labor force within particular health care facilities."'' 43
C. The Appeal to the Seventh Circuit
In July 1989, the Board filed a Notice of Appeal with the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Board argued that its
rulemaking did not violate the "in each case" language of section
9(b) because, even if the health care bargaining unit rule took ef-
fect, the Board would still have the obligation to decide other rep-
resentational issues.'" According to the Board, its obligation to
make these determinations in itself fulfilled the "in each case" re-
quirement. In addition, the Board argued that the application of
the "extraordinary circumstance" exception- admittedly narrow
in scope-when decided on a case-by-case basis, fulfilled the re-
quirement of Section 9(b).
In oral arguments held before the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals on January 10, 1990, the Board argued that its health care
bargaining unit rule did not violate the congressional admonition
against undue proliferation of bargaining units. 4 ' According to
the Board, the district court's notion that the rule violated Con-
gress' admonition because the rule did not "use the means least
likely to cause unit proliferation" ignored the very reason that
Congress had enacted the 1974 Health Care Amendments: to im-
rulemaking procedure, including those listed below, alone or in combination, constitutes
an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying an exception from the rule. The arguments
considered by the Board included:
(1) Diversity of the industry, such as the sizes of various institutions, the variety
of services offered by individual institutions, including the range of outpatient
services provided, and differing staffing patterns among facilities (as, for exam-
ple, a particular facility employing a larger or smaller number of RNs than
generally employed as a result of the advent of the multi-competent worker,
increased use of "team" care, and cross-training of employees); (3) the impact
of nationwide hospital "chains"; (4) recent changes within traditional employee
groupings and professions, e.g., the increase in specialization among RNs; (5)
the effects of various governmental and private cost-containment measures; and
(6) single institutions occupying more than one contiguous building.
53 Fed. Reg. at 33,932-33.
143. AHA v. NLRB, 718 F.Supp. at 716.
144. These issues included: whether a contract bar existed, whether the hospital was
an acute care hospital, and whether certain employees were supervisory or managerial.
F. Saubert, American Hospital Association versus the National Labor Relations Board, an
Update (Presented at the Mid-Winter Meeting of the ABA Committee on the Develop-
ment of Law Under the National Labor Relations Act, March 5, 1990).
145. Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 8 at A-9 (Jan. 11, 1990).
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prove patient care as well as the wages and working conditions of
health care workers.'" In support of this argument, the Board
cited Senator Cranston's remark in the congressional hearings on
the 1974 Amendments to the Act that the quality of patient care
would be improved if hospital employees were unionized. 47
In addition, the Board contended that the rule did not mandate
that eight bargaining units be created within each hospital. In-
stead, eight units would be created within a given hospital only if
the employees of the hospital attempted to organize all of the units
specified by the rule. Furthermore, the "extraordinary circum-
stances" exemption would shield an "atypical" hospital from expo-
sure to the possible difficulties associated with the obligation to
bargain with all eight units. 148
The court vacated the injunction.149 Writing for the panel,
Judge Posner stated that the term "undue proliferation" as used in
the congressional admonition "has always had reference to finer
divisions of the health care work force than attempted in the rule
under challenge." 50 Furthermore, the court ruled that because the
language of the congressional admonition was "cautionary rather
than directive," it could not be read to restrict the allowable
number of bargaining units in the health care industry to three.' 5'
The Seventh Circuit rejected the AHA's argument that the "in
each case" provision of section 9(b) barred the Board's wholesale
promulgation of a bargaining unit rule. The court read the "in
each case" language differently, holding that a case "can be an in-
dustry or (as here) a subset or submarket of an industry." It "need
not be a particular dispute between a particular employer and par-
ticular union at a particular plant or establishment."' 5 2 In addi-
tion, the court noted that because Congress had enacted the section
of the National Labor Relations Act giving the Board rulemaking
powers at the same time as it enacted the section requiring the
Board to make unit determinations "in each case," "it is probable
146. The author attended the oral arguments held before the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. The account of the arguments is taken from the notes she made during the
arguments.
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (during rulemaking, Board considered
fact that unionization might improve health care workers' wages and working
conditions).
148. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. AHA v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'g, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd 59 U.S.L.W. 4331 (April 23, 1991).
150. Id. at 659.
151. Id. at 658.
152. Id. at 656.
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that Congress would have made an explicit exception for unit de-
termination if it had wanted to place that determination outside
the scope of the Board's rulemaking power. "153
Finally, the court dismissed the AHA's argument that the rule is
arbitrary because it made no differentiation between acute care
hospitals on the basis of size or location. 154 Although recognizing
that this criticism was important, the court found wholly unaccept-
able the hospital industry's suggestion that a rule establish a rebut-
table presumption that the three unit minimum required by the
Act was the appropriate minimum for the health care industry.
Because the Seventh Circuit read the Act to imply that "the tilt
[among the competing interests of unions and employees] should
be in favor of unions," the court found that there was no basis for
placing the burden of rebutting a three-unit presumption on
unions.155
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens delivered a brief
opinion affirming the Seventh Circuit." 6 The Court summarily
disposed of the three arguments brought by the AHA and essen-
tially tipped its hat to the Board's broad powers. Pronouncing the
AHA as having "misread" the "natural meaning of the language
read in the context of [section 9(b)]," the Court handily dismissed
the argument that the Board lacked the power to engage in
rulemaking for an entire industry. Pointing to section 9(b)'s "in
each case" language, the Court emphasized that
the ordinary meaning of the statutory language cannot support
[the AHA's] construction .... As a matter of statutory drafting,
if Congress had intended to curtail in a particular area the broad
rulemaking authority granted in § 6, we would have expected it
to do so in language expressly describing an exception from that
section or at least referring specifically to the section.'
Despite the text's sparse legislative history, the meaning of "in
each case" seemed crystal clear to the Court, but even if the Court
had been unable to glean any meaning from the phrase, it would
have deferred to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 659-70.
155. Id. at 659.
156. AHA v. NLRB, 59 U.S.L.W. 4331 (April 23, 1991), affirming 899 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1990).
157. Id. at 4333.
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language. 158
The Court also had no trouble dealing with the argument that
the proposed rule violates the congressional admonition against
proliferation of bargaining units. First, it emphasized that the
Board's rule does not contravene the Board's mandate to deter-
mine the appropriate bargaining rule "in each case."' 59  Second,
the Count found that the Board had given "due consideration" to
the special problems that proliferation might create when it
promulgated its rule. If it was felt that the Board gave short shrift
to the problem of proliferation in the health care industry, "the
remedy for noncompliance with the admonition is in the hands of
the body that issued it." 16  Thus, any response was left to
Congress.
Finally, the Court rejected the AHA's argument that the rule is
arbitrary and capricious. In the Supreme Court, the AHA had re-
lied on St. Francis I to demonstrate to the Court that "the diverse
character of the health care industry precluded generalizations
about the appropriateness of any particular bargaining unit."' 6t The
Court concluded that the Board had arrived at this particular rule
only after a "reasoned analysis" of an extensive record:
The fact that [the AHA] can point to a hypothetical case in
which the rule might lead to an arbitrary result does not render
the rule "arbitrary or capricious." This case is a challenge to the
validity of the entire rule in all its applications. We consider it
likely that presented with the case of an acute care hospital to
which its application would be arbitrary, the Board would con-
clude that "extraordinary circumstances" justified a departure
from the rule ... Even assuming however, that the Board might
decline to do so, we cannot conclude that the entire rule is invalid
on its face. 162
Before leaving the matter, the Court cautioned that it had "deliber-
ately avoided any extended comment on the wisdom of the rule,
the propriety of the specific unit determinations, or the importance
of avoiding work stoppages in acute care hospitals." 63 Time will
tell.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 4334.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4335.
163. Id.
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V. ARE HEALTH CARE EMPLOYERS BARKING UP THE WRONG
TREE?
I will leave to the numerous scholars who have written articles
either supporting or criticizing the NLRB's proposed rule the issue
of whether the number of units established as appropriate by the
rule violates the congressional admonition against undue prolifera-
tion. Even though the Supreme Court has settled the matter, how-
ever, significant problems remain. Because the Court upheld the
rule, health-care employers still face many of the same problems
that they asserted would result from the "proliferation" in the
number of appropriate bargaining units established by the rule.' 6
Abolishing the statutory requirement that the Board not certify as
appropriate a bargaining unit containing both professional and
non-professional employees 165  partially would solve these
problems. This is not a remedy, however, that the courts can sup-
ply. Rather-as the Court suggests-the solution rests with Con-
gress. If Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the congressional admonition against undue
proliferation of bargaining units, then it may amend the Act in
order to reflect its current interpretation of the Taft-Hartley
amendments. Health care employers may have wasted their efforts
in the courts. Their goals might better be served by lobbying Con-
gress for an amendment to the NLRA that would limit the number
of health care bargaining units.
At the very least, Congress should consider amending the Act to
facilitate the creation of health care bargaining units that contain
some combination of professional, nonprofessional, and technical
employees. If health care employers are able to convince Congress
to enact such an amendment, they will gain the ability to adapt to a
rapidly changing health care work force. Currently there are
shortages of so-called "professional" and "technical" health care
workers, and there is no indication that this shortage will be allevi-
ated in the foreseeable future. Registered nurses, for example, are
in critically short supply throughout the nation. 166 In addition, the
164. For example, strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and wage whipsawing. See supra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
165. In this regard, the NLRA provides that "the Board shall not (1) decide that any
unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and
employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional em-
ployees vote for inclusion in such unit .... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988) (emphasis
supplied).
166. "RN vacancies at health care institutions have more than doubled between 1983
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numbers of medical technologists, 67 radiologic technologists, 6 '
occupational therapists and physical therapists' 69 can no longer
meet the demands of American health care employers. All of these
health care occupations fall into either the "professional" or "tech-
nical" health care units as described by the rule. What will happen
when health care employers are forced by severe health care
worker shortages to place technical workers 170 in professional job
classifications, 7Mor other non-professionals in technical job classifi-
cations? Disputes concerning unit scope surely will follow. 72 This
is one of the major objections to the promulgation of the proposed
rule that health care employers raised, and with good reason.
In addition, the Board has been unable to establish any clear
rules as to whether particular health care occupations fall under
the "professional"' 73 or "technical" classifications. For example,
although the Board repeatedly has found that medical technolo-
gists perform work that qualifies as "professional,"' 74 the Board
and 1987, from a rate of 4.4 percent to approximately 12 percent." Colosi & Krupman,
Bargaining Unit Status of Nurses" What Will the Future Bring?, 40 LAB. L. J. 361 (1989).
167. Chapman, Programs Target MT Shortage, CAP TODAY, December, 1989, at 1,
col. 2.
168. Appleby, Running Out: Scarcity of Radiologic Technologists, Who Are Moving to
Other Jobs Leaves Hospitals Struggling to Meet Growing Personnel Demands,
HEALTHWEEK, January 8, 1990, at 27.
169. Id
170. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (background of technical work-
ers discussed).
171. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (recounting how some health care
employers need the flexibility to switch personnel in order to meet changing needs).
Although it has been argued that state licensure or certification of health care profession-
als "make[s] job interchange impossible, or even illegal...", North Arundel Hosp. &
Maryland Nurses Ass'n, 279 N.L.R.B. (1986), this argument applies only to job in-
terchange among professionals.
172. The transfer of work out of a bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. This is a unit scope issue, rather than an illegal jurisdictional dispute. Sherman,
Collective Bargaining Over Work Assignment Proposals: Differentiating Between Concepts
of Jurisdiction and Unit Scope, 41 LAB. L. J. 3 (1990).
173. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) defines "profes-
sional employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its perform-
ance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accom-
plished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv)
requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a filed of science or learning cus-
tomarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction
and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished
from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine, mental, manual, or physical processes ....
174. See Twin City Hosp., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1988); Illinois Valley Community
Loyola University Law Journal
reached the opposite conclusion with regard to "laboratory tech-
nologists." 175 If the Board cannot decide which health care em-
ployees are professionals and which are technicals, how are health
care employers supposed to decide which tasks to assign to certain
groups of employees?
In order to continue to provide quality patient care, health care
employers must have the ability to fill job openings as quickly and
efficiently as possible. In today's changing health care environ-
ment, this may necessitate shifting the less technical job responsi-
bilities to registered nurses from licensed practical nurses in order
to maximize the use of the few available registered nurses in the
most intellectually demanding aspects of nursing. Similar shifts in
job responsibilities throughout health care institutions may become
increasingly necessary within other job classifications, such as med-
ical technologists and medical technicians. If Congress amends the
National Labor Relations Act to allow the certification of a bar-
gaining units containing both professional and technical employees
or technical and non-professional employees, health care employ-
ers would have fewer problems in attempting to fill essential posi-
tions that can no longer be filled with employees with "traditional"
backgrounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although a three-unit maximum arguably may not fulfill Con-
gress's intent in enacting the health care amendments, the Board's
present rule also fails to fulfill congressional intent in enacting the
health care amendments. As the Act currently is written, the
Board lacks the discretion to certify a professional-technical health
care bargaining unit. In order to ensure that health care employers
retain the flexibility to ensure quality patient care while also ensur-
ing health care workers the right to join or refrain from concerted
activities under the NLRA, the AHA should lobby Congress to
give the Board the legal authority to certify such a unit. The great-
est beneficiary would be quality health care.
Hosp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1049 (1982); Children's Memorial Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 222
N.L.R.B. 588, 590 (1976); Alexian Bros. Hosp., 219 N.L.R.B. 1122 n.6 (1975); Barnert
Memorial Hosp. Center, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 782 (1975).
175. See, e.g., Samaritan Health Servs., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1978) (blood labora-
tory technologist not professional because work not predominantly intellectual in charac-
ter and does not require advanced knowledge or training).
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